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As regards political commitment, Halévy’s seminal study (1995) has made Bentham 
known as a member of the ‘Radicals’ who, at the end of the 18th century in England, 
defended the equal vote, the secret ballot, and the principle of ‘No taxation without 
consent’. He is undoubtedly less known for proposing an almost complete plan of a 
utilitarian democracy, which he conceived in 1822 at the request of the Portuguese 
Cortes. Bentham worked on this project for ten years, trying to have it implemented in 
Greece, Tripoli, Portugal, and South America. He died in 1832, leaving the 
Constitutional Code unfinished. 
One cannot help but draw a parallel between this failure of Bentham’s reformism and 
that of the famous project of a prison called the Panopticon, which was both 
psychologically and financially ruinous for him. The naive philosopher who hoped that 
Parliament would allow him to manage a Panopticon according to his plans has 
frequently been mocked. Similarly, he may be laughed at for the universal disregard of 
his recommendations in the field of constitutional reform. A closer look at those 
recommendations may even encourage the promoters of human rights to think that 
forgetting them was indeed the best thing to do. 
 
2. 
But the similarities between the two projects, which are both at the same time 
intellectual creations and political battles, cannot be reduced to their somewhat 
ridiculous collapse and misunderstanding. Bentham’s constitutional writings, which are 
truly monuments of constitutional theory, do reflect the Panopticon project, which was 
undertaken more than thirty years earlier.2 This proximity has been highlighted, giving 
rise to a violent criticism of Bentham’s obsession with social control and his neglect of 
the integrity of human beings. The more he promoted reforms, the more he designed a 
utopia of confinement. By transposing the principles he had designed for prisons to the 
political sphere, he foreshadowed the totalitarian state. 
The meaning of ‘panoptism’ follows from how Bentham coined the word. The Greek 
etymology suggests the idea of seeing everything everywhere (Bentham 1997b, 16). 
The purpose is to catch sight of everything people do, to know everything about them, 
and to register them. And the people, knowing that they may be watched, are under a 
control that is permanent in its effects even if it is not actually performed at every 
                                                 
1 Universities of Paris X – Nanterre and Versailles – Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines. It is a pleasure for me to 
express my gratitude to Laure Domy and Alice Annandale who helped me with the translation of this 
paper. I also wish to thank warmly Emmanuelle de Champs for her careful discussion of an earlier draft 
and for correcting my English. 
2 The Panopticon writings consist of letters written in 1787, and of two Postscripts written in 1790 and 
1791. 
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moment.3 They are thus deterred from conducts that would anger their warder and 
provoke sanctions. The device guarantees the omniscience and omnipotence of power, 
which acts upon the conscience. 
 
3. 
Today, panoptism has become possible on a wide scale, due to technological advances, 
computer files, video, web cams, and the internet. Forms of panoptism have been 
noticed in movies,4 and are becoming more and more frequent on television (Kerviel 
2001). Therefore, it seems appropriate and even necessary to understand the nature of 
the power that is at stake here. Paying attention to the works of the major theoretician of 
this form of power thus seems a natural approach. Bentham’s writings also prove very 
interesting from a philosophical perspective, for the similarities between his penal and 
constitutional thoughts pose great difficulties of interpretation. 
I will first attempt to demonstrate that drawing a parallel between Bentham’s two 
reflections, the penal and the constitutional, seems unavoidable (I). I will then attempt 
to prove that a full appreciation of this convergence has given rise to many debates as to 
the nature of Bentham’s work and its contemporary significance (II). 
 
 
I. From Prison Panoptism to Political Panoptism: the Similarities of the Projects 
 
If the government must possess all the necessary power to do well, i. e. to promote the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number, one needs to ensure that it actually has this 
end in view. In Bentham’s constitutional theory, this requisit inspires devices of perfect 
and total visibility, which can be seen as a metaphorical universalization of panoptism 
(I.1). In the Constitutional Code, this universalization also has a more specific 
dimension (I.2). 
 
1. A Double Dynamics of Information: the Metaphorical Universalization of Panoptism 
 
In order to contribute to the greatest happiness, the ruling few must pay constant 
attention to individual utilities and assess them by adequate means (I.1.1). Such 
omniscience must be controlled by a set of ‘securities against misrule’ that rest on 
publicity (I.1.2). 
 
                                                 
3 Bentham 1995, 34: “The more constantly the persons to be inspected are under the eyes of the persons 
who should inspect them, the more perfectly will the purpose of the establishment have been attained. 
Ideal perfection, if that were the object, would require that each person should actually be in that 
predicament, during every instant of time. This being impossible, the next thing to be wished for is, that, 
at every instant, seeing reason to believe as much, and not being also able to satisfy himself to the 
contrary, he should conceive himself to be so”; ibid., 43: “It is the most important point, that the persons 
to be inspected should always feel themselves as if under inspection”; ibid., 94: “The object of the 
inspection principle is […] to make [the prisoners] not only suspect, but be assured, that whatever they do 
is known, even though that should not be the case.” 
4 Cf., e. g., P. Almodóvar, Kika, 1993; M. Poulette, Louis XIX. Le roi des ondes, 1994; P. Weir, The 
Truman Show, 1998; R. Howard, Ed TV, 1999. This is, however, far from a purely recent phenomenon, 
cf. Carrière 2001. 
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1.1. From individuals to the legislator: from the science of passions to the science of 
legislation 
1.1.1. Bentham assigns four goals to governments: “subsistence, abundance, security, 
and equality; each maximized, in so far as is compatible with the maximization of the 
rest” (Bentham 1823, 4). By establishing the rights and duties of individuals, legislation 
defines a public framework of social interaction and induces individuals to behave in a 
way that contributes to the greatest happiness. This method requires precise knowledge 
of human behaviour.5 An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
analyses simple forms of pleasures and the corresponding pains, the complex forms of 
pleasure and pain in which they can result, and the circumstances that influence 
sensibility, intentionality and consciousness, thus drawing a complete anatomy of 
human behaviour: 
 
“Pleasure then, and the avoidance of pains, are the ends which the legislator has in 
view: it behoves him therefore to understand their value. Pleasures and pains are the 
instruments he has to work with: it behoves him to understand their force, which is 
again, in another point of view, their value.” (Bentham 1970a, 38) 
 
Bentham’s arithmetical process6 allows to calculate the value of any sensation and to 
compare it with other pleasures and pains, so as to promote the sensations that 
maximize happiness. By acting on the motives of human action, the legislator intends to 
direct individuals to a behaviour that, once it is artificially coordinated with the 
behaviour of others, leads to a combination of actions that maximizes global happiness. 
Due to constant variations in the utility of individuals, the legislation must constantly be 
adapted, thus becoming an active day-to-day work. Bentham’s tools are conceived to 
deal with this set of data. A utilitarian government is thus an investigating government. 
 
1.1.2. Collecting information on the utility of the population is one of the tasks of 
Bentham’s new logic, which he distinguishes from Aristotle’s propositional logic. His 
aim is to provide a logical treatment of sentences expressing volition, of which 
interrogations are one kind among others. This Logic of the Will 
 
“is more particularly applicable to the business of government: that subdivision which 
concerns the forms of imperation at large having a more particular regard to legislation; 
that which concerns the forms of interrogation, to the less dignified but not less 
necessary business of collecting verbal information: a process subservient to the 
business as well of the legislative as of the executive departments” (Bentham 1970a, 
300 n. b2). 
 
The government must collect information in diverse fields, such as agriculture, finance, 
industry, and so on. A large bureaucracy must gather statistical evidence and interpret it 
in order to be ready for any circumstance: natural disasters, epidemics, crises, famines, 
etc. In the Legislature, a “legislation enquiry judicatory” (Bentham 1991, 93-111), and 
                                                 
5 Pannomial Fragments, in Bentham 1838-1843, vol. III, 224-230. 
6 Bentham 1970a, 38-41; Bentham MS dealing in particular detail with the principles of a moral 
calculus, in Baumgardt 1952, 554-566. 
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at the local level, a “local registrar” have this function,7 which is indispensable to the 
utilitarian production of law. 
In Bentham’s democratic theory, information is conveyed through the vote. The election 
system must allow everybody to express what maximizes their utility. He introduces the 
principle of “virtual universality of suffrage” (Bentham 1819). Because everyone 
experiences utility, the total sum of which is to be maximized, the only exclusions 
admitted are those contributing to the greatest happiness, viz. those of the insane, of 
minors, of soldiers used to obeying, and of some criminals. It is noteworthy that 
Bentham admits the vote of women.8 So as to reflect sincerely the utility of the 
individuals, suffrage must be free and secret. It thus provides reliable information for 
the legislative calculus. 
Parallel to this first dynamics of information from individuals to the legislator, there is 
another which runs from the governors to the citizens. 
 
1.2. From the governors to the citizens: the transparency of power 
1.2.1. According to Bentham, only a complete body of law can function as law. Law is 
essentially a means to induce a particular behaviour through words (Bentham 1977, 59, 
72; 1970b, 82). It must be clearly, briefly and precisely written, and systematically 
organized within published codes. All its provisions, rights, duties, powers, liberties, 
and prohibitions must be traceable to sensations.9 Only then will the law be 
understandable, contrary to the English law of his time, which he criticises as complex 
(Bentham 1977, 141-144, 153; Lieberman 1985) and expensive, resorting to fiction and 
jargon, and which remains the domain of a minority. According to him, the Common 
Law is not conveyed by any intelligible sign but is a matter of conjecture from the 
courts’ decisions. It cannot provide a public and stable reference for the coordination of 
social life and the guidance of behaviour. 
In contrast, by permitting a detailed calculus of the utility of individual behaviours, 
Bentham’s law allows everyone to determine their own rule of action: 
 
“In a map of the law executed upon such a plan there are no terrae incognitae, no blank 
spaces: nothing is omitted, nothing unprovided for.” (Bentham 1970b, 246) 
 
At the same time, as it influences the individuals’ self-control (Lyons 1991, 131), the 
law seems an overwhelmingly powerful instrument. Such a risk of misrule must be 
addressed by Bentham. 
 
1.2.2. The instruments of all governments are the same. The difference between ‘good 
rule’ and ‘misrule’ depends on the way they are used. Bentham rejects traditional 
                                                 
7 Constitutional Code, in Bentham 1838-1843, vol. IX, 625-636. 
8 Bentham 1990, 58: “Not excluded from this judicatory [the Public Opinion Tribunal] are, as such, any 
persons of the female sex. From the exercise of a share of the Constitutive power by means of votes in 
the election of the possessors of the Supreme operative power or a share in it, they the gentler half of the 
species stand as yet excluded by tyranny and prejudice.” Cf. also Essay on Representation, in Mack 
1968, 448-453, where Bentham denies them this right, but underscores the weakness of his reasons 
before carefully leaving the subject. 
9 The Essay on Logic, in Bentham 1838-1843, vol. VIII, 247 f., elucidates the word ‘obligation’ in terms 
of oppression by a heavy body, viz. a sensation of pain. 
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means, such as the separation of powers10 or a second House in Parliament (Bentham 
1831, 1926). For him, the quality of a ruler relies upon his “moral aptitude” – i. e. the 
will to promote the greatest happiness –, his “intellectual aptitude”, and his “active 
aptitude”. Bentham designs a system of securities that applies to all officials (Bentham 
1991, 117). Aptitudes rest on responsibility, brief incumbency, non-immediate 
reeligibility for elected officials, immediate revocability, and an obligation of assiduity. 
Officials also must pass exams and undergo a training period before taking office. For 
Bentham, the maximization of the aptitudes essentially rests on the dependence of the 
governors on the governed,11 hence the necessity of making voters one of the 
constitutional authorities of the state (Loche 2000, 340-342; D’Alessandro 1981, 77-78). 
In Bentham’s conception of bureaucracy, tasks are precisely distinguished and defined, 
so they can each be assigned to a single responsible agent. Both the efficacy of the 
power and the control of the people depend on the intelligibility of the tasks. The 
transparency12 of public activity is the essential remedy to misrule.13 These devices are 
useful for the Public Opinion Tribunal. It consists of all those persons who can know 
anything about governmental activity, form an opinion about it, and express it (Bentham 
1990, 28). This fictitious Tribunal receives claims and accusations, collects evidence, 
listens to arguments, forms an opinion, expresses it and executes it accordingly. 
Whereas officials are responsible for enforcing legal sanctions, the Public Opinion 
Tribunal enforces the popular sanction, which arises from the people’s spontaneous 
disposition towards the rulers: 
 
“For all these operations, one and the same article presents itself as the effectual and the 
only effectual instrument. This instrument is no other than a Newspaper: multitude of 
instruments of the same sort employed by so many sets of hands, and multitude of 
copies of each, as great as possible. In this instrument may be seen not only an 
appropriate organ of the Public Opinion Tribunal, but the only constantly acting visible 
one.” (Bentham 1990, 44 f.) 
 
Through reading, discussing and voting, the political education of individuals is 
improved. Hampering the action of the Tribunal, for example by restricting the 
freedoms of the press, of communication and association, by public lies, and, in general, 
“every act, whereby […] a man seeks to weaken the effective power of the Public 
Opinion Tribunal [...] is evidence, of hostility on his part to the greatest happiness [...]. 
He may, without fear of injustice, be numbered among the enemies of the human 
species” (Bentham 1991, 41; cf. also Bentham 1991, 40; Constitutional Code Rationale, 
in Bentham 1989, 292). 
 
Bentham’s system of cross-information guarantees that a government knows everything 
about its society, while the society knows everything about the activities of its 
                                                 
10 On the Efficient Cause of and Measure of Constitutional Liberty, in Mack 1968, 453-457; Sophismes 
anarchiques, in Bentham 1829-1830, vol. I, 564. 
11 On the Efficient Cause and Measure of Constitutional Liberty, in Mack 1968, 456. 
12 Economy as Applied to Office, in Bentham 1989, 102. 
13 Bentham 1990, 25: “One word – misrule – will serve for conveying a general conception of the 
disease: another word – publicity, for conveying the like conception of the remedy.” 
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government. This amounts to the universalization of panoptism from a metaphorical 
point of view. Besides, the similarities of Bentham’s penal and constitutional theories 
also have a more concrete dimension. 
 
2. Similarities of Constitutional and Prison Devices: the Real Universalization of 
Panoptism 
 
A common perspective inspires the Panopticon writings and the constitutional writings, 
first, on the level of the basic principles (I.2.1), but also on the level of their practical 
implementation (I.2.2). 
 
2.1. The basic principles 
2.1.1. Whenever one intends to guide the behaviour of individuals according to the 
requirements of economy and security, panoptism seems to be natural. Bentham’s 
device is adapted to “any sort of establishment, in which persons of any description are 
to be kept under inspection; and in particular to penitentiary-houses, prisons, houses of 
industry, work-houses, poor-houses, manufactories, mad-houses, lazarettos, hospitals, 
and schools” (Bentham 1995, 29, cf. ibid. 76-95), and eventually to keep watch even on 
the governors. In penal as well as in constitutional law, the purpose is to monitor actual 
or would-be delinquents. This is the reason why Bentham insists on a “confidence-
minimization principle” (Bentham 1991, 118) with respect to the rulers, and offers a 
political theory that does not rest on hiding the mechanics of power. He distinguishes 
between private offences detrimental to identifiable persons, semi-public offences 
detrimental to some part of the population, self-regarding offences detrimental primarily 
to the offender himself, and public offences detrimental to all members of a state 
(Bentham 1970a, 187-191). Governors are in a position to commit public offences on a 
large scale. It is necessary preventively or curatively to orient their behaviour. 
In the Panopticon, inspection has five configurations, every one of which is conducive 
to the greatest happiness: (1) prisoners are watched by the warders; (2) the governor of 
the Panopticon watches his subordinates; (3) the subordinates watch the governor; (4) 
the prisoners watch one another because of a system of mutual responsibility; (5) the 
whole structure is open to the public at large (Bentham 1995, 45-48). The only “dark 
spot” is that prisoners cannot watch their warders. This is the only limit to the analogy 
between the Panopticon and Bentham’s democratic state. In the latter, panoptism is 
perfect. Bentham himself suggests this analogy, writing that “in regard to the exercise 
of the power of the supreme constitutive [i. e., the electors], either in the dislocation or 
the punition of its supposed offending agents, what is desirable is, that the actual 
application of it, be as rare as possible, and at the same time in the breasts of those same 
agents, the expectation of its eventual application, as strong as possible” (Constitutional 
Code, in Bentham 1838-1843, vol. IX, 106). Like the prisoners of the Panopticon, the 
rulers’ imagination is to be acted upon. 
 
2.1.2. In his Constitutional Code Rationale, Bentham presents three principles of his 
constitutional politics. The first describes the end of government: the greatest happiness. 
The second describes human nature: self-preference (cf. also Supreme Operative, in 
Bentham 1989, 212). The last prescribes the junction of interests, i. e. “the means of 
bringing what is into accordance with what ought to be” (Constitutional Code 
Rationale, in Bentham 1989, 235). 
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As human nature remains always the same, to change those who govern is useless. On 
this premise, the very structure of the Constitution must provide for the pursuit of the 
principle of utility (Constitutional Code, in Bentham 1838-1843, vol. IX, 105). It must 
deprive the agent either of the interest or of the power to perform the “sinister sacrifice” 
of general utility to his personal utility. In the first case, the objective is to act upon his 
motivations, so as to make the pursuit of the greatest happiness the most prefered course 
of conduct.14 The main technique to reconcile duty and interest rests on the “pleasures 
of good name” (Bentham 1970a, 44), gained through the citizens’ gratitude. This 
principle is at the very core of panoptism.15 In the second case, the limitation of the 
power to perform the “sinister sacrifice” rests on subjecting officials to constant 
monitoring. 
The common perspective of Bentham’s two projects seems obvious. And this also 
applies to the level of their specific application. 
 
2.2. The details of the constructions 
2.2.1. Bentham constantly underscored the importance of architecture.16 The object of 
the Panopticon Letters is to have “Morals reformed – health preserved – industry 
invigorated – instruction diffused – public burdens lightened – Economy seated, as it 
were, upon a rock […] – all by a simple idea in Architecture!” (Bentham 1995, 31). In 
the Code, Bentham states that “on architecture good Government has more dependence 
than men have hitherto seemed to be aware of”,17 and dedicates to it pages that clearly 
echo the Panopticon (Bentham 1991, 438-457). The thirteen ministers should occupy 
thirteen buildings set in a circle near the Prime Minister. Communication tubes permit 
permanent contact between them. This parallels the communication, water and heating 
tubes of the Panopticon (Bentham 1995, 110-114). 
The structure of the Panopticon is well known. It is circular, with a tower in the centre 
from which one can watch the individuals situated in the cells all around the building. 
These cells are open on their interior side, so that all inmates can be seen or known. The 
prisoners, in turn, cannot see their warder in his tower (ibid., 35-37). They do not know 
when he watches them, but at the same time they are aware of the constant possibility of 
being watched. Bentham offers many technical details concerning lighting, heating, 
ventilation (ibid., 83 f.), food preservation (cf., e. g., the remarkable frigidarium, in 
Cohen 1997), and the materials to be used, which are evidence of his technical 
competence and innovative spirit. In the Constitutional Code, the interior building of 
the ministries consists of a central office, surrounded by “waiting boxes” where citizens 
can secretly monitor their agents’ work. The watcher is no longer at the centre, and the 
watched is no longer a delinquent. Bearing the constant and omnipotent censure of the 
people is one of the fundamental duties of public officials (Bentham 1991, 40). 
 
2.2.2. For Bentham, 
                                                 
14 Constitutional Code Rationale, in Bentham 1989, 240; cf. also the principle of “duty and interest 
junction” in Bentham 1823, 12. 
15 Cf. Hume (1981, 161) listing Bentham’s basic principles. 
16 And until today, this remains a preoccupation in the penal field; cf. Demonchy 1998. 
17 Bentham 1991, 55; cf. also Tactique des assemblées politiques délibérantes, in Bentham 1829-1830, 
vol. I, 442. 
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“publicity is the first of cautions, it perfects everything. It is the best means to put the 
moral motives and the intellectual aptitudes into action. This prison, built according to 
the panoptic principle, is just as if transparent” (Bentham 1997b, 32). 
 
Managers must publish their methods, accounts, details of their whole management, so 
that anyone can see whether they do their job. They are made “examinable and cross-
examinable viva voce upon oath at any time” (Bentham 1995, 53). 
In the National Charity Company, a Panopticon for the poor, Bentham also advocates 
scientific management (Tracts on Poor Laws and Pauper Management, in Bentham 
1838-1843, vol. VIII, 358-439). A system of “book-keeping” records information on the 
population (who works, what tools they own, what income they receive, what they 
produce), on stock (history of the means, their acquisition and use), on public health, on 
individual behaviour, and on interpersonal correspondence: 
 
“The responsibility to prepare and publish reports or to allow open access to certain 
documents was a common feature in most of his schemes. These arrangements were 
intended partly to facilitate internal control and decision making […] and partly to 
promote public oversight and control.” (Hume 1981, 151) 
 
At all levels, the Constitutional Code organizes a system of inspection and registration 
(Bentham 1991, 276-282). According to the principle of “public account keeping” 
(Bentham 1993, 293-301), standard documents describe the activities of the 
governors.18 Service books describe the operations through which the job is done. Loss 
books summarize the quantities and causes of losses. The outset book describes the 
means of the ministries. It is divided into personal, immoveable, moveable, and money 
books. The Journal books display the movements of means. All these data require an 
appropriate and economic method to be collected, ordered, reproduced and diffused. 
With many details, Bentham advocates a system of abbreviation and reproduction 
(Bentham 1991, 159-162), so as to register every moment in life. 
Therefore, one cannot fail to associate Bentham’s constitutional reflections and his 
prison reflections, either as regards the basic principles or in the tiniest details. As 
Hume puts it, 
 
“Bentham developed many of his ideas about organization and management as solutions 
to particular problems in particular institutions. But once he had devised them, they 
were available to be used again and he himself rarely saw them as having only a local 
application. He freely translated them from one institution to another.” (Hume 1981, 
161) 
 
One necessarily has to concentrate on this quite problematic convergence. 
 
 
II. From Prison to Society: the Ambivalence of Bentham’s Doctrine 
                                                 
18 Cf. Bentham 1991, 218-267: the “statistic” and “recordative” functions are exposed, according to 
several books that are in their turn detailed. 
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The similarities of his writings have provoked divergent interpretations among 
“Bentham Scholars” (II.1). Without siding with either detractors or supporters, it is 
worth underscoring the coherence of Bentham’s project, so as to measure its 
contemporary interest (II.2). 
 
1. A Controversy Between Scholars 
 
According to some writers, Bentham’s doctrine provides evidence for a pathological 
obsession with social control (II.1.1). Others offer a more indulgent reading, which 
insists on the limited scope of the Panopticon project (II.1.2). 
 
1.1. Panoptism, a harmful obsession 
1.1.1. Political panoptism seems to reveal the essence of the utilitarian vision of power, 
which is associated to the obsession of an absolute social control (cf. Bahmueller 1981, 
e. g., 156-163, 201-217). Bentham’s obsession leads him to universalize the inferno of 
the Panopticon, and to make the Constitutional Code the pattern [I don’t know if my 
sentence is correct here. I want to say that according to some authors, the Cstit code is a 
model for totalitarian states. Anyway, I can’t write that Bentham organized the Code 
around the pattern of the totalitarian state, for this would be an historical mistake] of the 
totalitarian state (Posner 1976; Himmelfarb 1968, 1970). Himmelfarb even regards the 
Panopticon as embodying the very principles of philosophical radicalism, whereas for 
Bahmueller, this vision of power is Bentham’s own, and is detachable from 
utilitarianism itself (Bahmueller 1981, 212 f.). 
As Foucault puts it, panoptism acts on the very structure of the mind. “Thus discipline 
is internalised, while the inspector himself has become superfluous” (Božovič, 
Introduction to Bentham 1995, 17). Bentham was indeed a far subtler analyst of human 
psychology than is usually acknowledged (cf. Cléro/Laval 1997; Marí 1982, 209). He 
fully understood the power of symbolism and the impact of panoptism (Božovič, 
Introduction to Bentham 1995, 1-27). And he noted that “being constantly under the 
eyes of an inspector, is to lose as a matter of fact the power to do evil, and even the very 
thought of willing it” (Bentham 1997b, 16). With a more frightening tone, he added 
that: 
 
“Inspection: here is the unique principle, to establish order and to maintain it, but an 
inspection of a new sort, which strikes the imagination rather than the senses, which 
makes hundreds of men depend on one, by giving to this one man a sort of universal 
presence. […] The inspector, being invisible, reigns like a spirit” (ibid., 15 f.). 
 
From this derives the automatic and permanent efficacy of the power (Foucault 1975, 
234), just as if the inmates were subject to an omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent 
God (Božovič, Introduction to Bentham 1995, 1-27). 
 
1.1.2. Bentham’s objective seems to be to build a utilitarian society on a real scale. In 
the Panopticon, people lose vicious habits and are re-educated to a so-called “sane” 
practice of the felicific calculus. In the end, inmates have become “new men” (Bentham 
1997b, 47). Bahmueller (1981) repeatedly underscores the oppressive and confining 
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character of the institution, which eventually allows the individuals’ “utilitarianization” 
(ibid.; cf. also Long 1977) through the mechanics of pain and reward. 
Bentham’s purported moral reform rests on a battle against idleness, and shows a kind 
of protestant asceticism (Marí 1982, 208; Semple 1993, 122), inculcated by means of a 
repressive and rationalized paternalism. The discipline of work is very strict. The 
administrator of the Panopticon has at his disposal a numerous and cheap labour force 
for whatever he wants to be done,19 which indicates that panoptism serves the interest 
of the industrial middle-class.20 Bentham is intent on collecting even the smallest share 
of productive work, according to the capacities of each inmate (Bentham 1995, 54-59, 
Letter XIII: “Means of Extracting Labour“), and constantly wants costs to be 
minimized, both in the Panopticon and in government. This is the reason why 
Bahmueller (1981, 121) writes: “when Bentham heard the words ‘increased costs’ he 
reached for his gun”. The allusion does not seem a happy one, but it illustrates a reading 
of Bentham’s work that underscores its dangers. For this author, it is clear that 
“Panopticon prison was a particular application of a general principle of social 
discipline” (ibid., 58), based on the most absolute, the most efficient, and the deepest 
control of human individuality. 
Facing such a utopia (Bentham’s word: 1995, 56), one wonders what inferno would 
look like (Bahmueller 1981, 104). Nevertheless, this vision has been disputed. 
 
1.2. Panoptism, a limited and beneficial project 
1.2.1. According to Campos Boralevi, the Panopticon is a punctual answer to a precise 
problem. Rosenblum21 and Semple also think that the Panopticon is simply an 
instrument of government (as Bentham says: cf. 1995, 93), and not a paradigm of 
government. Indeed, it seems necessary to put the project in its historical context. 
Within a larger criticism of a severe penal policy, Bentham intended to deal with the 
problems of delinquency, alcoholism, idleness and poverty in 18th-century-England. He 
introduced an economical method of surveillance. Economy did not only apply to 
money (Bentham 1995, 51-54), but also and even more to human suffering.22 
Punishment is a pain, which as such had to be minimized (Bentham 1970a, 158). A 
correction-book recording any punishment, and open to the public, had to be kept. 
                                                 
19 Bentham 1995, 55: “One thing [the contractor] would not fail to say to me is – What trades may I put 
my men to when I have got them? My answer is soon given. Any whatever than you can persuade them to 
turn their hands to.” 
20 Bentham 1995, 71: “In what points a manufacturer setting up in such establishment would be in a 
worse situation than an ordinary manufacturer, I really do not see; but I see many points in which he is in 
a better.” 
21 Rosenblum 1978, 19 f.: “Panopticon was a practical design for an institution – a prison, school, factory, 
or workhouse – and no more. It was not a microcosm of the state, and Bentham did not use it to criticize 
actual states. […] Panopticon was not meant to serve as a model of anomic or authoritarian relations 
generally.” 
22 Economy as Applied to Office, in Bentham 1989, 5: “Expense” is any type of cost in terms of pain; 
Bentham 1995, 49: “Rendering unnecessary that inexhaustible fund of disproportionate, too often 
needless, and always unpopular severity, not to say torture – the use of irons”; ibid., 63: “I don’t know 
that I should be for allowing [the contractor] the power of beating his borders, nor, in short, of punishing 
them in any shape”; ibid., 81 f.: “separate cells, exposed, as in the case of prisons, to inspection, would 
render the use of chains and other modes of corporal sufferance as unnecessary in this case as in any.” 
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Opposing the conditions of detention and banishment of criminals, the outcome of 
which was frequently death,23 opposing other reforms that were too severe, too mild or 
too expensive, Bentham proposed an undoubtedly more humane project. It rested on a 
strong utilitarian basis, for its preventive and curative effects were superior to those of 
the other projects. Moreover, they were achieved at lower financial cost, because of 
private administration (Bentham 1995, 51 f.), and without involving useless sufferings. 
 
1.2.2. The profit of the private manager of the Panopticon depended on the work he 
imposed on the inmates. Their motivation depended on their remuneration (ibid., 67). 
Thus the interest of the manager was to take care of his prisoners. He also had to pay a 
penalty for every inmate that died in his establishment, whereas he could save money 
for every preserved life (ibid., 64 f.). Bentham intended to remedy the problems of 
hunger, cold, filth, infection, diseases, and ill treatment (Bentham 1997b, 32, 40; 1995, 
37-38n, 46 f., 62 f.). 
The Panopticon ensures that the manager is watched (Semple 1993, 140-152; Bentham 
1995, Letter XII: “Contractor’s Checks”), which links his interest to the maximization 
of utility. The population at large, named the “tribunal of the world” (Bentham 1995, 
48), is admitted to visit the institution. On the one hand, this deters individuals from 
breaking the law: 
 
“In Bentham’s eyes, punishment is first and foremost a spectacle […] insofar as 
punishment is not intended for the punished individual, but for all others” (Božovič, 
Introduction to Bentham 1995, 4; cf. also Bentham 1995, 100-101n). 
 
Moreover, due to sympathetic sensibility,24 the people at large feel compassion, which 
will, along with financial incentives (Bentham 1995, 68 f.), facilitate the reintegration of 
former inmates in the society. On the other hand, the manager is induced not to make 
the prisoners suffer more than necessary. 
Again, the construction rests on the “duty and interest junction principle”. It is ordered 
so that the interest of the manager is not to mistreat his inmates, but to allow their 
emancipation. From the inmates’ perspective, working allows them to earn some 
money, to recover their capacity to form expectations, and to think of a better future, by 
making an effort on themselves. As Dube (1991, 314-334) puts it, the project intends to 
restore in the individuals the dignity of industrious and honest men. Its main spring is 
the valuation of utilitarian behaviours through reward, instead of punishment. 
Nowadays, many prisons are undoubtedly far less humane than Bentham’s propositions 
(Moreso 1992, 375), as the reports of the International Prison Watch testify year after 
year. Vice, violence, overpopulation, and sanitary problems remain and even increase 
(Gentilini 1994; Vasseur 2000). Therefore, one cannot deny the “moral” dimension of 
panoptism (Semple 1993, 112 ff.). This is reflected on the political level by the 
maximization of what is also called the “moral” aptitude of governors. 
                                                 
23 Bentham 1995, 75 f. Cf. also A View of the Hard Labour Bill, in Bentham 1838-1843, vol. IV, 1-35; 
Panopticon versus New South Wales, in Bentham 1838-1843, vol. IV, 37-172. 
24 Bentham 1970a, 57: “By sympathetic sensibility is to be understood the propensity that a man has to 
derive pleasure from the happiness, and pain from the unhappiness, of other sensitive beings.” 
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Though it has been criticized for its totalitarian dimension, panoptism must be judged, 
as Bentham would have intended it, according to its consequences (Bentham 1970a, 
100). From this point of view, it may not be so harmful. If one insists on an internal 
reading of Bentham, panoptism turns out to be significant for his whole enterprise. 
 
2. Bentham’s Enterprise 
 
Bentham’s doctrine is derived from one principle (ibid., 1). Panoptism is perfectly 
inserted in this coherent and all-embracing strategy (II.2.1). Today, Bentham’s 
enterprise seems feasible (II.2.2). 
 
2.1. A coherent and all-embracing enterprise 
2.1.1. Bentham’s ideal of the transparency of power is not simply the product of an 
obsession with social control. It is the result of his ambition to promote the greatest 
happiness and to reveal usurpations stemming from force, moral corruption, and 
language (Bentham 1996b, 1997a). Within Bentham’s panoptic devices, a self-
sustaining dynamics of power increases the aptitudes of the prisoners, the warders, the 
people and the governors. Having worked out the tiniest details, first on a limited scale 
and then on the level of the whole society, of the concrete possibilities of the principle 
of utility is one of Bentham’s major contributions to philosophy. Panoptism guarantees 
that each individual, whatever his situation, contributes to the greatest happiness. 
Bentham’s Constitutional Code portrays the 20th-century state, possibly including its 
worst trends. It nevertheless presents the fundamental aspects of the contemporary 
constitutional state (Pendas García 1988), based on representative democracy, universal 
suffrage, political responsibility, active local and central institutions, and basic 
prerogatives granted to individuals. From the stone to the metaphor (D’Alessandro 
1981, 102), from the circumscribed space of prison to the whole society, Bentham’s 
invention, despite the horror it may inspire, is fascinating. Its mechanics seem to have a 
supernatural force, but is only the necessary result of the principle of utility. Bentham’s 
republic and the Panopticon are natural parts of his philosophy. 
 
2.1.2. Bentham’s writings are very rich. They are concerned with legal issues (legal 
philosophy, jurisprudence, legal politics) as much as with political science (political 
communication, sociology of organizations, sociology of power, theory of the elites, 
social psychology), and with linguistics, logic and economics. The idea of transparency 
of information and communication provides a link between the different elements of his 
works and allows a global reconstruction of his thought. Willing to reform society 
according to the principle of utility, he ponders over the law. In order to implement his 
technology of social reform, he develops an original theory of law as an expression of 
volition, and a new logic, foreshadowing the logic of norms of the 20th century (Tusseau 
2001, 103-127). The will of the legislator is to be known through language, which is 
where his interest for language and his properties derive from. He aims at an analysis of 
language in terms of real entities, without fallacies, and elucidates the function of 
fictions in it (Bentham 1996b, 1996c, 1997a; cf. also Božovič, Introduction to Bentham 
1995, 1-27, who links panoptism and the theory of fictions). Transparency and the 
diffusion of information seem to set the very framework of his enterprise. Language, be 
it written or symbolic as in panoptism, must convey information as clearly and as 
efficiently as possible to realize the utilitarian direction of behaviours. 
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The analogies between Bentham’s projects are evidence of the coherence and scope of 
his reformism. Nowadays, these projects seem practicable. 
 
2.2. A practicable enterprise 
2.2.1. Starting from a teleological principle that can hardly be contested, Bentham 
provides a wide range of technical devices to put it into practice. This interest is 
deepening today, as technical improvements make panoptism possible. Thanks to 
computers and video, registering and stocking data have become fast, easy, and reliable. 
The internet makes their diffusion on a wide scale possible, with great certainty and 
authenticity. 
Reflections on cyber-democracy or “e-democracy”, which could renew both the 
participation of citizens and the control of governing bodies, are on the rise:25 
 
“One can conceive of electronic democracy as the use by all citizens of all technological 
and interactive means […] to get informed on public action, to voice proposals […] and 
then to vote on that public action”.26 
 
Interactivity permits reaction in real time, immediate proposals, a genuine dialogue,27 
and a permanent system of referenda that revives the concept of direct democracy. In 
France, both legislative assemblies and the government have websites that inform on 
their activities. It is also possible to follow legislative debates on television. Official 
sites and public services have common access points.28 At the European level, the 
Interchange of Data between Administrations program aims at improving the free 
movement of public information,29 and policies have been undertaken in order to 
develop the internet.30 Finland and Ireland have undertaken strong policies aiming at 
developing public political discussion online.31 
In the field of public administration, the internet is seen as a means to improve public 
management (Schnäbele/Beauvais 2001). The French Ministry of Economy, Finance 
                                                 
25 See the associations Admiroutes (www.admiroutes.asso.fr), Agoranet (www.agoranet.org), Euro 
citizen action service (www.eacas.org), Veille européenne et citoyenne sur les autoroutes de 
l’information (www.vecam.org). 
26 “Démocratie électronique en France. Situation en mars 2001”, 
www.admiroutes.asso.fr/action/theme/democratie/demoelec.htm. 
27 P. Mathias, “Internet et démocratie”, http://barthes.ens.fr/scpo/Presentations99-
00/Esclatine/esclatine.htm. See www.democratieinteractive.com. 
28 Cf., e. g., www.admifrance.gouv.fr, www.service-public.fr. 
29 Public sector information: a key resource for Europe. Green Paper on public sector information in the 
information society COM/98/0585 final; www.europa.eu.int/ispo/ida. 
30 Catinat 2000; Europe’s way to the Information Society. An Action Plan, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament and to the Economic and Social Committee, and 
the Committee of Regions, COM/94/347 final. 
31 K. Holkeri, “Share Your Views with Us. A Finnish Experience of Involving Citizens with ICT”, 
www.univ-paris1.fr/droit-internet-2002/pdf/en/Holkeri.pdf; R. Kavanagh, “The Public Service Broker. A 
Model for Delivering ePublic Services”, www.univ-paris1.fr/droit-internet-2002/pdf/en/Kavanagh.pdf. 
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and Industry initiated a program of “e-ministry”,32 as part of a larger Program of 
Governmental Action for the Information Society.33 A recent symposium held by the 
Conseil d’Etat and Paris I University insisted that new technologies could help the 
administration to offer better services to the citizens.34 Laws and administrative 
regulations can be discussed with a wider consensus as regards their opportunity and 
implementation. The internet offers a simple, fast and cheap means to express oneself, 
and grants new instruments to the Public Opinion Tribunal. 
A first experiment in internet voting has taken place in Arizona, March 7-11, 2000. In 
France, for instance, A. Santini, the mayor of Issy-les-Moulineaux, has made his town a 
pioneer in this field. On March 16, 2000 the first world forum of e-democracy took 
place.35 Many towns take advice from their citizens before undertaking projects. Voting 
machines have been tested in cities such as Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Strasburg, and 
Brest. While preserving the anonymity of the vote, they economize on paper and time 
(as well as on public administration; Beloulou 2001). Each machine costs € 4,573, so 
that its cost is written off by the third polling day.36 Strassman, the director of the 
Campaign for Digital Democracy, presented a sophisticated system to allow individuals 
to react on all public matters while insuring an anonymous and secure vote. The system 
can immediately interpret the entire spectrum of opinions. Therefore the net allows the 
popular will to become permanent, ubiquitous, omniscient and omnipotent. 
Precise statistics are at the legislators’ disposal to enact the utilitarian law, with the 
constant possibility to consult the people and to know about the evolution of their utility 
(Bonnefoy 1964; Heilbronner/Drago 1959; Weber 1968; cf. also supra n. 31). Law is 
more widely diffused and accessible, thanks to official political and legal websites. The 
new technologies of information and telecommunication allow an increased 
administrative efficiency (Catinat 2000). The double dynamics of information that link 
the rulers and those being ruled enjoys new and functional structures. Here are the 
means to promote the greatest happiness along Bentham’s framework. If the 
Constitutional Code looked like a utopia, now it is within reach. 
 
2.2.2. Underscoring the fact that the conditions are present for a form of panoptic 
democracy should not necessarily imply blind enthusiasm.37 Several monographs by the 
Communauté d’études pour l’aménagement du territoire relating to experiments in 
Basel, Bologna and Lausanne (Guyaz 2000) have underlined the limits of e-democracy. 
The websites of political institutions are not frequently visited. One of the main 
difficulties is the limited and unequal access to the internet among countries (this is one 
of the major preoccupations of the EC; cf. Catinat 2000; Blanchard 2001, 15). France is 
                                                 
32 B. Pêcheur, “L’administration électronique comme facteur de modernisation et de simplicifation : 
l’exemple de l’e-ministère lancé au MINEFI”, www.univ-paris1.fr/droit-internet-
2002/pdf/en/Pecheur.pdf. 
33 Comité interministériel pour la société de l’information, Programme d’action gouvernemental pour 
l’entrée de la France dans la société de l’information, 1998. 
34 Conseil d’Etat, Université Paris I – Panthéon Sorbonne, L’administration électronique au service des 
citoyens, 21-22 janvier 2002, cf. www.conseil-etat.fr/ce-data/index2.htm. 
35 www.professionpolitique.com/forum/default_new.htm. 
36 “Démocratie électronique en France. Situation en mars 2001”, supra n. 26. 
37 See www.democratieinteractive.com. 
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developing “public Internet access points” in post offices, stations, and the Paris metro. 
Individuals must also be educated to use the new technologies. 
From a technical point of view, one cannot neglect the risks of interception, control, 
censorship, and the doubts raised concerning the secrecy of the vote and the 
identification of voters. These problems have caused considerable concern for the EC.38 
The new technologies of information also give rise to a new criminality which proves 
very hard to control (Martin/Martin 1998; Blanchard 2001, 5). 
The virtual agora can rapidly degenerate into a din of isolated voices. There is also 
considerable risk that along with the three traditional powers, and the fourth of the 
press, a fifth power is going to develop, to wit, that of computer experts. Instead of a 
new democracy, it could be the birth of a new oligarchy. Monopolies concentrating 
publishing houses, radios, TV channels, websites – i. e., both the technologies and their 
diffusion – may rapidly gather the whole real power.39 The internet also permits the 
spread of rumours or “hoaxes”.40 Errors and lies can work more rapidly and effectively 
than ever. In a nutshell, one cannot disregard the potential nuisance of e-democracy. 
Bentham’s work, nevertheless, still offers tools, such as his theories of fictions and 





My purpose with this paper was neither to defend nor to criticize Bentham’s panoptism. 
I only meant to focus on a reflection that offers a conceptual framework within which 
our present situation can be understood. A first thesis was presented, according to which 
it may be said that Bentham’s political theory, since he was pursuing the same goal, has 
its roots in the principles of the Inspection House. His democratic theory is actually a 
generalization of the principles of the Panopticon. However, in contrast to other authors 
who come to the same conclusion, I have not taken this as a ground for a criticism of 
Bentham’s thought in terms of an obsession with social control. According to my 
second thesis, his projects illustrate the coherence of his thought, constantly directed 
towards a goal one can hardly disagree with. I have then introduced a third thesis, 
according to which today Bentham’s panoptism is feasible. 
                                                 
38 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data; Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the regions, Ensuring security and trust in electronic 
communication. Towards a European framework for digital signatures and encryption COM/97/0503 
final; Directive 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications 
sector; Decision No. 276/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 January 1999 
adopting a multiannual Community action plan on promoting safer use of the internet by combating 
illegal and harmful content on global networks; Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market. See Bischoff 1998; Kerstens 1999; Brühann 1999a, 1999b; 
Swetenham 2000. 
39 J. de Rosnay, www.professionpolitique.com/forum/default_new.htm, and the question “Who governs 
the Internet ?”, www.strategic-road.com/dossiers/govrnint.htm. 
40 Bernaert 2001; see www.hoaxbuster.com. 
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Eventually, one may wonder whether one should try to implement it. But, and this is the 
last thesis I wish to formulate, it may be too late to wonder about this. There may be no 
time left to choose panoptism. Willy-nilly, we are already subjected to a panoptism, we 
are registered, filmed, and counted by a network of widespread and permanent powers. 
At this point, what we are lacking, what is missing for the greatest happiness of the 
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